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The Development of
Cold War Soldiery
Acclimatisation Research and Military
Indoctrination in the Canadian Arctic,
1947–1953
M AT T H E W S . W I S E M A N
Abstract: Between 1947 and 1953, leading scientists at Canada’s Defence
Research Board (drb) administered physiological and psychological
experiments on soldiers conducting indoctrination training for Arctic
warfare. Designed in an attempt to determine the ideal characteristics of
cold-weather soldiery, one experiment resulted in physical and mental injury
to two participating troops. Although the army immediately questioned
its participation in further drb testing because of the sustained injuries,
ethical issues of human testing seemed not to deeply penetrate military and
defence discourse concerning the involvement of troops in acclimatisation
research and indoctrination training. This article examines cold-weather
human testing to argue that the development of Cold War soldiery in Canada
conformed to superficial gender ideals about virile masculinity in the early
postwar period.
“Great physical and mental effort is required under conditions of
extreme cold and high windchill to remain aggressive. The cold and
unusual conditions of life can, if allowed, impose a heavy strain on
morale. Every opportunity must be taken to seek out and destroy the
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enemy in order to increase the strain on the enemy, to deprive him of
rest and time to prepare food, and eventually destroy him.”1

D

Cold War period, the Canadian Arctic became
a training ground for Western forces. Together with American
and British counterparts, Canadian troops took part in a series of
military exercises, designed to prepare both men and equipment for
cold-weather warfare.2 Each exercise aimed specifically to determine
infantry requirements as well as the tactical techniques and
coordination methods required for military operations in extremely
cold winter conditions. The most well-known exercise remains the
three-month northern excursion named Operation Musk Ox, which
combined Canada-United States military support and reinforced
notions that the Canadian Arctic represented the first line of defence
against a potential attack on North America.3 Less well-known but
also important to the Canadian military and defence establishment
was Sun Dog One, a one-month exercise carried out in an effort
to deduce and overcome environmental challenges unique to Arctic
military operations.
Sun Dog One served a scientific as well as military purpose.
During the exercise, scientists of Canada’s Defence Research Board
ur ing the ear ly

1
  As quoted in the final report of Sun Dog One, prepared under the direction of
the Chief of General Staff and published by the Directorate of Military Training; see
Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 24, Volume 4206, File 270-0-89-6, Library and
Archives Canada (LAC), 12.
2
  The Canadian military participated in no fewer than twenty-two northern
operations in the first decade of the Cold War, including exercises “Eskimo,” “Polar
Bear,” and “Lemming” (1945); “Musk Ox” (1946); “Moccasin” (1947–1948); “Sigloo”
(1948–1949); “Cross Country,” “Sweetbriar,” “Sun Dog One,” and “Shoo Fly One”
(1950); “Sun Dog Two,” “Shoo Fly Two,” “Measureall,” and “Pole Star One, Two
and Three” (1951–1952); “Sun Dog Three,” “Deer Fly One, Two and Three,” and
“Prairie Tundra One” (1952); “Prairie Tundra Two” (1952–1953); and “Bull Dog”
(1953); see C.E. Law, J.A. Easterbrook, and M.F. Coffey, Defence Research Board
Northern Laboratory: Progress Report on an Assessment of Current Equipment and
Methods used by Army Personnel for Ground Navigation in the North, 30 June 1954,
RG 85, Volume 299, File 1009-2[5], LAC. For an abbreviated list of Canadian army
exercises in the North between 1945 and 1953, including dates, locations, and aims,
see Andrew B. Godefroy, In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s
Cold War Army (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2014), 87–88.
3
  See Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a
National Insecurity State, 1945–1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994),
141–142 and Robert Teigrob, Warming up to the Cold War: Canada and the United
States’ Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2009), 64–65.
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(drb) observed trials of Canadian, American, and British cold-weather
clothing and equipment. Scientists from the drb also conducted
experimental trials on participating troops as part of an acclimatisation
and indoctrination programme that aimed to determine the physical
and psychological requirements of cold-weather soldiery. Symptomatic
of broader Cold War desires to understand and overcome the natural
environment, indoctrination training in the Canadian Arctic served
to regulate anxieties of inadequacy and perpetuate seemingly false
notions of control and power amongst planners, observers, and
participants. Although training proved effective and educational,
the lessons learned came at a cost. Scientists deemed some troops
physically or temperamentally weak for cold-weather operations and
thus less favourable for Arctic service than men whose physical and
mental attributes posed no apparent or potential detriment to the
morale and effectiveness of the other participating troops.
Neither Sun Dog One nor the cold-weather research conducted
on participating troops was vital to the continental defence of North
America, but both provide important insights for considering the
role and structure of Canada’s postwar military. According to the
existing literature, the defence of Canada in the nuclear age depended
primarily on a fully integrated air system that included radar and
jet interceptors.4 Canada embraced a middle power philosophy and
bolstered its national security through multilateral and bilateral
agreements. In the process, the Canadian military underwent
massive reductions in operating budget and personnel strength.
Defence against an increasingly hostile Soviet Union depended on
international cooperation rather than independent professional
standing forces. Yet Canada’s defence establishment funded scientific
work to investigate human performance under military training in
severe cold. drb science conducted in collaboration with the military
suggests that defence officials were open to the possibility that
Arctic defence might include a well-trained land element. The science
speaks to postwar gender ideals as well. Officials equated adequate
performance in severe cold with virile notions of masculinity. To be
4
   See for example, by date of publication, Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs:
Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945–
1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987); Robert Bothwell, The
Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International
Affairs, 1998); and Sean M. Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear
Weapons During the Cold War (Washington: Potomac, 2007).
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a Cold War Arctic soldier meant not only survival in but also the
defeat of Canada’s most harsh environmental elements.
Historians have only recently begun to uncover the depth of
Canada’s Cold War scientific activity, but recent research shows
the complex integration between the Canadian national defence
establishment and military.5 Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew
Farish have argued that postwar Western military interest in the
Canadian Arctic signalled not only “the systematic consolidation
of nature as military entity, but also an extension of the scope
and terms of militarization to reflect the cautious longevity of the
Cold War.”6 Situating the postwar northern military exercise in a
broader environmental discourse, Lackenbauer and Farish explore
the pervasive legacy of Cold War militarism in Canada in a manner
that moves beyond the more traditional diplomatic or social analyses
of the period.7 This article also examines the pervasive legacy of
Cold War militarism, but highlights human as well as environmental
aspects. Although Canada’s northern climate and geography
significantly shaped defence policy in the early postwar years, military
preparedness was also a direct corollary of defence science.
Cold-weather human testing represents an interesting aspect of
military preparedness, but as a topic remains largely unexplored by
historians. This article examines the connection between military
indoctrination and scientific cold-weather acclimatisation research in
an effort to contextualise an important aspect of Canada’s Cold War

5
  Two significant contributions to the field of Canada’s Cold War defence-related
science include, Andrew B. Godefroy, Defence and Discovery: Canada’s Military
Space Program, 1945–74 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011);
and Donald Avery, Pathogens for War: Biological Weapons, Canadian Life Scientists,
and North American Biodefence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).
6
   P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish, “The Cold War on Canadian Soil:
Militarizing a Northern Environment,” Environmental History 12, no. 4 Special Issue
on Canada (2007), 920–950.
7
  Some other foundational works on Cold War Canada include, by date of
publication, Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada (1994); Greg Donaghy, ed.,
Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943–1957 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade, 1998); Andrew Burtch, Give Me Shelter: The Failure of
Canada’s Cold War Civil Defence (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
2012); Tarah Brookfield, Cold War Comforts: Canadian Women, Child Safety, and
Global Insecurity, 1945–1975 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2012);
Isabel Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951–64
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013); and Godefroy, In Peace
Prepared (2014).
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Canadian parachute-qualified personnel
who will be posted to the 1st Canadian
Parachute Battalion undertaking winter
infantry training at A-35 Canadian
Parachute Training Centre (Canadian
Army Training Centres and Schools),
Camp Shilo, Manitoba, Canada, 20 March
1945. [Capt. Frank Royal / Canada. Dept.

of National Defence / Library and Archives
Canada / PA-209726]

legacy while also contributing to a growing international literature
on human and environmental science in the early postwar period.
Sun Dog One represents an ideal case study. During the exercise,
scientists tested the physical and mental qualities of troops operating
under severe cold-weather conditions. The experiments were part of an
Arctic acclimatisation research and indoctrination training programme,
initiated to isolate the ideal male characteristics of cold-weather soldiery.
In turn, Canada’s defence and military establishment attempted to
develop a process to isolate men deemed physically and mentally
valuable to support a northern defence. Sun Dog One consequently
provides a unique window into the development and impact of Cold
War soldiery, an intriguing topic about military masculinity that
provides many insights for Canadian historians and raises important
questions about the ethics of human testing and defence science in the
years immediately following the Second World War.
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seeds of arctic interest
Interest in the Arctic increased dramatically during the Second
World War with the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands, the
establishment of British and Soviet east-west routes for the transport
of aircraft, and a series of massive construction projects initiated
by the United States. North American continental defences began
to take shape accordingly, as Washington funded the construction
of extensive infrastructure and facilities to service “isolated” areas
including the Alaska Highway, airfields to support aircraft service to
Alaska, over fifty weather stations, and an oil distribution system
between Yukon and the Northwest Territories named the Canol
Project. The United States also acquired a lease to an air base at
Goose Bay, Labrador, to serve as a location from which the air force
could potentially bomb the Soviet Union and see its aircraft return.8
At the same time, the Canadian government agreed to co-finance the
construction of early warning radar systems with the United States.
Within six years of 1949, contracts stipulated the construction of the
Pinetree Line, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Distant Early Warning
(dew ) Line.9
During the 1940s, a proliferation occurred in maps oriented over
the North Pole.10 Air-age globalism revealed the surprisingly close
geographic proximity of the Soviet Union, and North American
territory emerged expansive and vulnerable at the top. In the process,
the Arctic became a frontier space of both strategic and scientific
importance, an ideal laboratory for intellectual pursuit that had
implications of a local and global significance. The American military
embraced this logic and approached the North as a vital component
of continental defence but also as one of many hostile environments
to overcome. The situation led to an expansive and highly entangled
relationship between military and scientific affiliations, as historians
8
  Peter Kasurak, A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950–2000
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013), 11.
9
  For a detailed timeline of North American air defence cooperation between
Canada and the United States with regard to radar, see Daniel Heidt and P.
Whitney Lackenbauer, “Sovereignty for Hire: Civilian Airlift Contractors and the
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, 1954–1961,” in P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Deicing required!: the historical dimension of the Canadian Air Force’s experience in the
Arctic (Ottawa: National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 2012), 95–112.
10
  Matthew Farish, The Contours of America’s Cold War (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota, 2010), 174.
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of science and the Cold War have shown.11 As Matthew Farish
explains in an intricate study of American knowledge production,
“the Arctic frontier was engineered—not just in the sense of specific
landscapes and bodies as sites for technical manipulation and control
but also according to more general principles of development, order,
and appropriation for scientific and strategic needs.”12 Coupled with the
growing tensions between the East and West, the Arctic, as both an
idea and physical space, was ripe for a high-anxiety postwar “assault.”
Although the terms sovereignty and defence may seem
interchangeable, in the context of the postwar security environment
Canada faced two distinct threats. As fears of a Soviet attack grew,
research teams, administrators, and troops pushed northward to study
and occupy the largely “unknown” region. Collectively, on behalf of
the Canadian government, these individuals worked to defend the
North against Soviet aggression while also promoting territorial
sovereignty in the midst of increasing encroachment from the United
States. There was certainly mutual agreement in both Ottawa and
Washington that precautions were necessary to protect the North
American continent, but at the same time officials in Canada showed
concern for the rapid increase of American activity north of the border.
As noted by Rob Huebert, concerns worsened periodically in Canada
when various American officials mused about the possibility of “taking
control” of Canadian territory to prepare their own defences against the
Soviet threat.13 Yet Canada was not in a position to provide the necessary
resources required of a modern and effective national defence. In spite of
the emerging concerns about American encroachment, Canada had little
choice but to collaborate closely with its southern neighbour in defence
of the North American continent.
While the nuances of early Cold War defence relations between
Canada and the United States require further attention, the current
body of literature seems to agree that the Americans respected
Canadian claims to territorial sovereignty in the North. Rather than
annex parts of the seemingly remote and ignored Canadian Arctic,
  Ronald E. Doel, “Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences: The Military’s
Influence on the Environmental Sciences in the USA after 1945,” Social Studies of
Science 33, no. 5 (2003), 635–666.
12
  Farish, The Contours of America’s Cold War, 176.
13
   Rob Huebert, “Walking and Talking Independence in the Canadian North,” in An
Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future, Brian
Bow and Patrick Lennox, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Pres, 2008), 119.
11
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Washington desired to work in collaboration with Ottawa to establish
the adequate defence system that officials in both cities deemed
necessary. In many ways, the situation proved quite advantageous for
Canada. The government gained access to the physical and financial
resources of United States and simultaneously bolstered its defensive
position against the Soviet Union. Scholars debate whether Canada
sacrificed its sovereignty in the process, but diplomatic negotiations
resulted in bilateral arrangements with real and lasting benefits to
both Canada and the United States.14

canada’s postwar military
The Canadian army emerged from the Second World War lacking
a large staff that could focus on national military strategy. During
the early postwar period, the office of the science advisor to the
chief of the general staff at Army Headquarters only had a small
civilian analytical component. While a few senior Defence Research
Board (drb ) officials were part of the headquarters, the professional
staff of the Canadian Army Operations Research Establishment
never exceeded fifteen personnel. As argued by Peter Kasurak, these
circumstances proved a significant shortcoming in the directive of
Army Headquarters as it faced the challenges of the emerging Soviet
threat.15 Nevertheless, the Canadian government authorised the
creation of an air transportable brigade known as the Mobile Reserve.
Comprised of three infantry battalions with combat support and
service support units, the brigade was renamed the Mobile Striking
Force (msf ) in 1948. Officials designed the msf as a preventative
land element that would deter the Soviets from establishing forward

  Shelagh Grant has suggested that Canada sacrificed its sovereignty in
Arctic defence negotiations with the United States; see Sovereignty or Security:
Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936–1950 (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1988). Others have emphasised sound decision-making,
open dialogue, and respect on both sides. See P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter
Kikkert, “Sovereignty and Security: Canadian Diplomacy, the United States, and the
Arctic, 1943–1968,” in In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Greg Donaghy and Michael
K. Carroll, eds. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011), 101–120.
15
  Kasurak, A National Force, 16.
14
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operating bases in the Canadian North.16 At the time, technology
restricted long-range bombers from making roundtrip flights over
the North Pole. Continental defence, therefore, depended on the
ability of the msf to prevent the Soviets from establishing re-fueling
service stations on North American territory. The msf also served
to promote Canadian claims to territorial sovereignty by facilitating
operational cooperation with United States forces.
Although the msf bolstered the presence of the Canadian military
in the North, scholars tend to agree that the postwar land element
served only a partial role in the defence of the North American
continent. This assessment finds support in the personal convictions of
Canada’s Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton. Unconvinced
that the Soviets posed a direct threat against the Canadian North,
Claxton never spent more resources on ground defences than was
politically necessary. He provided the minimum support required to
sustain the msf and restricted military funds elsewhere. Under his
authority, the Canadian army did not figure prominently in either
foreign or domestic policy.17
During the early postwar period, Ottawa embraced a middle
power philosophy and sought to secure Canadian sovereignty at
home and abroad through involvement in international partnerships
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (nato), North
American Air Defence Command (nor ad), and the United Nations
(un). Multilateral and increasingly bilateral agreements provided the
backbone of Canadian defence. The military underwent a drastic
reduction as a result, and the Mackenzie King government reallocated
federal finances toward other national priorities that included veterans’
benefits, family allowances and other social-welfare programs.18
Within two years of the end of the Second World War, the army
reduced in personnel strength from 478,090 to only 15,852.19
   For information on the MSF, see Sean M. Maloney, “The Mobile Striking Force
and Continental Defence 1948–1955,” Canadian Military Journal 2, no. 2 (1993),
75–88; Bernd Horn, Bastard Sons: An Examination of Canada’s Airborne Experience
1941–1995 (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001); and Raymond Stouffer,
“Military Culture and the Mobile Striking Force” in P. Whitney Lackenbauer, De-icing
required!, 58–70.
17
   See for example, Colonel Bernd Horn, ed., The Canadian War of War: Serving
the National Interest (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006); and Kasurak, A National Force.
18
  For an assessment of the impact that federal finance reallocation had on the
postwar Canadian military, see Andrew Godefroy, In Peace Prepared.
19
  Kasurak, A National Force, 11.
16
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As an instrument of national power, the Canadian military suffered
from a lack of coherent and durable political guidance and became
both fragmented and disjointed.20 While American and Canadian
scientific and defensive interests largely coincided in the period,
government officials in Ottawa supported research of a non-strategic
orientation. Hugh Keenleyside, for instance, shared with Minister of
Foreign Affairs Lester Pearson the view that Canada should support
resources and research over strategy and politics.21 As deputy minister
of mines and resources, commissioner of the Northwest Territories,
and chairman of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee of the
drb , Keenleyside was a high-ranking official with a significant level
of influence on northern affairs and finance spending. He received
an informal education on the Canadian North and its indigenous
populations from Arctic geographers such as Vilhjalmur Stefansson,
Erling Porslid, and Trevor Lloyd, and used his position in government
to promote the spread of “industrial civilization” northward.22 Defence
considerations in the North were lower on his agenda than the work
of scientists, explorers, administrators, educators, doctors, and social
workers.23 He participated in the creation and subsequent activities
of the Arctic Institute of North America, and supported the drb as
modern scientific establishment.
In spite of rapid demobilisation and cost cutting, the Canadian
military maintained a notable contribution to national security in the
immediate postwar years. As argued by Andrew Godefroy, “[that]
the postwar Canadian Army was ultimately capable of innovating
and adapting to meet new threats alongside its two main allies under
such conditions suggests that a great deal of military enterprise and
innovation occurred within the institution.”24 Godefroy does not
suggest that all changes to postwar military structure were novel and
successful, but he nonetheless maintains that historical scholarship is
too critical of the Canadian military during the early Cold War period.

  Howard G. Coombs and Richard Goette, “Supporting the Pax Americana:
Canada’s Military and the Cold War,” in Colonel Bernd Horn, ed., The Canadian
War of War: Serving the National Interest (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006), 265–296.
21
   Hugh L. Keenleyside, Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside, Volume 2: On the Bridge
of Time (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 308.
22
  Ibid.
23
  Ibid., 310.
24
  Andrew Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 49.
20
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Godefroy’s assessment finds support when we consider northern
cooperation between the military and drb scientists. While the air threat
to North America dominated strategic considerations in Ottawa during
the early postwar period, defence officials remained cognisant of the
vulnerability of the Canadian North by sea and land. In advance of a
potential Soviet land attack, the military turned to science to find and
prepare men for the potential cold-weather battlefield. Defence planners
deemed cold climate training important to the development of troop
indoctrination and preparation, and intelligence confirmed the need to
prepare a defence against the shortest and most direct route over the North
Pole. Canadian troops were to learn how to survive and use their weapons
under Arctic conditions, while drb scientists were to isolate the masculine
characteristics required of cold-weather soldiery. These circumstances
developed from a Cold War ideology in which the environment featured
prominently as a “laboratory” for scientific exploitation.25

postwar military activity in the north
The Canadian military first tested the adequacy of military men
and equipment in the North during the winter of 1945–1946.
Operations Eskimo, Polar Bear, and Lemming were designed to
determine the effects of severe climatic conditions on the mobility
and combat efficiency of Canada’s striking forces. The location of
each exercise differed, which allowed for the testing of equipment
in northern environments under varying conditions and challenges
of both terrain and temperature.26 Exercises Musk Ox and North
occurred the following year, as the army continued to improve
tactics, techniques, and procedures for living and fighting in severe
cold-weather conditions. None of these field exercises were large-scale
operations, nor were they conducted to test the ability of joint land-

   While Canadian literature outside Lackenbauer and Farish (see note 6) has yet
to broach this topic, similar themes have been addressed in the American context.
See, for instance, Matthew Farish, “The Lab and the Land: Overcoming the Arctic
in Cold War Alaska,” Isis 104, no. 1 (2013), 1–29.
26
   For a brief overview of Canada’s Winter Warfare Programme of 1944–1945, see
Hugh A. Halliday, “Recapturing the North: Exercises “Eskimo,” “Polar Bear” and
“Lemming,” 1945,” Canadian Military History 6, no. 2 (1997): 29–38.
25
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air operations to resist mock Soviet aggressor forces.27 As a result,
the army continued to conduct both individual and joint exercises
with the Royal Canadian Air Force (rcaf ).
Arctic warfare differed considerably from winter warfare in that
its potential battlefield existed in vast spaces only reachable by air.
Whereas units conducting winter warfare could rely on existing
roads, railheads, and other supply infrastructure, Arctic warfare
units trained to maximise self-containment and rely only on available
air supply.28 Canada took part in cold-weather warfare exercises in
both Arctic and sub-Arctic conditions. Canadian and American
military planners defined the “true” Arctic as any terrain north of the
treeline, including tundra and mountain ranges. Conversely, planners
defined the sub-Arctic as any northern treed terrain, including the
treed plain of northern Manitoba and Saskatchewan, the Northwest
Territories, the mountains of northern British Columbia, the Yukon,
and southern Alaska.29
In May 1946, the United States proposed to Canada a unified
Arctic defence plan on the premise that neither the oceans nor the
vast territoriality of the Arctic was anymore an adequate barrier to
protect the northern half of the North American continent against
long-range weapons or invading armies.30 In the same month, the
Canadian chiefs of staff approved the formation of an Interservice
Committee on Winter Warfare, with a sub-committee on winter
warfare research. By 1947 defence science expanded significantly
in Canada and the sub-committee was subsequently reorganised as
the Arctic Research Advisory Committee under the chairmanship
of Hugh Keenleyside, the deputy minister of mines and resources
and commissioner of the Northwest Territories.31 The committee
held its first meeting on 15 May and decided that, while science
could assist military operations in the Arctic, the military could also

  Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 85.
   Halliday, “Recapturing the North,” 29–38.
29
  Dr. O.M. Solandt, Exercise “Sweetbriar”: An Address to The Empire Club of
Toronto, 30 March 1950, RG 24, Volume 2484, File HQS-736-10-17-2-5, LAC.
30
   James Reston, “Unified Arctic Defense Plan Proposed by U.S. to Canada: Joint
Bases, Weather Stations in Far North, Coordinated Training and Equipping of
Forces in Scheme Put to Ottawa,” New York Times, 18 May 1946, 1.
31
   Defence Research Board Arctic Research Advisory Committee, 5 December 1949,
Appendix A “Summary of Activities of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee,”
RG 85, Volume 298, File 1009-2[2], LAC.
27
28
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be of considerable assistance to scientific research by provision of
transportation, facilities, and personnel on occasion.
Although top officials in the Canadian defence establishment
showed little interest in placing standing forces in the North, support
for cold-weather military exercise training ran deep. Speaking to
the House of Commons on 17 March 1950, Minister of National
Defence Brooke Claxton spoke about his experience as an observer
of exercise Sweetbriar, which took place during the winter of 1949–
1950.32 The exercise tested the latest developments in clothing, food,
aircraft, vehicles, weapons, and other equipment and material, but
its primary objective was to develop doctrine and procedures for the
employment of combined Canada-United States forces operating in
the sub-Arctic.33 Over five thousand combined forces took part in the
ten-day exercise, which also included 978 motor vehicles and more
than 100 aircraft. Sweetbriar was the largest joint Canada-United
States northern military exercise at the time, so when speaking to the
House, Claxton congratulated all officers and men who had, in his
estimation, contributed to the success of the exercise “in accordance
with the best traditions of the Canadian forces.” Claxton further
applauded the exercise by noting specifically the effectiveness of
cooperation between the army and air force, and Canadian and
American troops.
Claxton was not the only top Canadian defence official to speak
favourably about northern military training. A few weeks later on
30 March, Omond Solandt, Chairman of the Defence Research
Board, made an address to the Empire Club of Toronto in which he
spoke about his experience as a scientific observer of Sweetbriar.34
Echoing Claxton’s comments, Solandt spoke of Sweetbriar with
specific reference to training and equipment for combined sub-Arctic
operations. The exercise did not involve new weapons and took place
in weather conditions that were less severe than those encountered
by both Canadian and American troops in training, but it did inspire
novel equipment development and the need for further controlled
cold-weather environmental training. The most important single

  Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 2nd
Session: Vol. 1, 17 March 1950, 853–854.
33
  Ibid.
34
  Dr. O.M. Solandt, Exercise “Sweetbriar”: An Address to The Empire Club of
Toronto, 30 March 1950, RG 24, Volume 2484, File HQS-736-10-17-2-5, LAC.
32
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lesson of Sweetbriar was, according to Solandt, the importance of and
ease with which the Canadian and us armies operated harmoniously
and effectively in severe cold conditions. When questioned about the
success of the exercise, other Canadian and American military officials
who attended as observers were noncommittal. Some expressed shock at
the state of defences in the Canadian North, while others optimistically
believed joint military preparedness remedied any existing deficiencies.35
With regard to both the training of men and the use of equipment in
cold weather, Canada’s military and defence establishment determined
many weaknesses of its northern defences. The exercise also made clear
that neither Canada nor the United States was ready to conduct winter
warfare; additional training was required.
Exercise Sweetbriar displayed the potential ability of troops to
operate efficiently in the sub-Arctic and demonstrate the adequacy
of logistical support under such conditions.36 Combined support was
an essential component of exercise Musk Ox, but not under the force
strength that was available during Sweetbriar. Observers of Sweetbriar
pointed out certain conditions incident to northern exercises that
required improvement, but overall the exercise successfully dispelled
unnecessary fears associated with cold-weather military operations.
With proper clothing, equipment and training, troops were able to
manoeuvre under sub-zero temperatures with fewer actual mock
casualties than estimates had forecast. Observers concluded that
logistic support was adequate to maintain larger forces and ongoing
military operations in Canada’s northern environment. Similar
conclusions were being made simultaneously about 2,000 kilometres
east at Fort Churchill, Manitoba by participants and observers of
military exercise Sun Dog One.

sun dog one
Exercise Sun Dog One was an extension of infantry training that
had taken place at Fort Churchill during the winter of 1948–1949.
Located on the west bank of Hudson Bay in Manitoba’s northeast

  Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 2nd
Session: Vol. 4, 9 June 1950, 3408.
36
  Extract from US Army Field Forces Newsletter, 1 May 1950, RG 24, Volume
2484, File HQS-736-10-17-2-5, LAC.
35
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corner, Fort Churchill’s location, terrain, and harsh winter weather
made it an ideal environmental locale for northern military training
and scientific defence research. Sun Dog One comprised 251
personnel, which by comparison made the exercise significantly
smaller than Sweetbriar.37 The exercise consisted of an entirely selfcontained and mobile force, who lived and travelled for nearly one
month close to Fort Churchill. The tactical goal of Sun Dog One was
to facilitate the appreciation of the probable role of armour, field
artillery, and engineers in support of one infantry company operating
in a severe cold-weather environment.38 All appreciations assumed
that supply to all units was available. The one-month time allowance
enabled repetition of certain techniques and ensured time for exercise
workability, photographic retakes, and variation in weather.39 Planners
sacrificed some measure of realism for scientific observation.
The operational concept of exercise Sun Dog One envisaged the
pursuit and destruction of an enemy party approximately fifty strong,
which dropped near the Hudson Bay railway at Chesnaye. The
exercise began on 16 February 1950 and ended nearly one month later
on 15 March. Planners chose the route and terrain of the exercise
specifically to test the supply and communication organisation of
participating personnel. The first leg of the route took troops through
heavily bushed terrain on a trail prepared by a Royal Canadian
Engineers Test Team. The remaining distance traversed flat and open
tundra covered by many small lakes and sloughs. In open areas, snow
was hard, shallow, and rough with wind anvils, while in treed areas
it collected in deep and soft powdery drifts. Temperatures during the
exercise were somewhat below the normal mean for that winter. The
lowest temperature recorded was minus forty-two degrees Celsius
and the mean approximately minus twenty-nine degrees Celsius. The
maximum recorded wind chill was 2,300 or approximately minus
fifty degrees Celsius and the mean was 1,700 or approximately minus
thirty degrees Celsius.40 While these temperatures were comparatively
higher than other Arctic locales from the same winter, high winds
   Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 24, Volume 4206, File 270-0-89-6, LAC.
  Training Wing Fort Churchill: Exercise Sun Dog 1, RG 24, Volume 2484, File
HQS-726-40-39-7, LAC.
39
   For a detailed description of Sun Dog One, included photographs of the exercise,
see Brief on Exercise “Sun Dog One,” 25 February 1950, RG 24, Volume 2484, File
HQS-726-40-39-7, LAC.
40
  Ibid.
37
38
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Canadian parachute-qualified personnel who will be posted to the 1st Canadian Parachute
Battalion undertaking winter infantry training at A-35 Canadian Parachute Training Centre
(Canadian Army Training Centres and Schools), Camp Shilo, Manitoba, Canada, 20 March
1945. [Capt. Frank Royal / Canada. Dept. of National Defence / Library and Archives Canada / PA-209722]

experienced during the exercise did at times drastically increase the
rate of heat loss in participating troops.
Canadian exercises in winter and Arctic warfare prior to Sun
Dog One demonstrated the limits of troops operating in demanding
conditions, not of survival but of endurance. Varying topography and
climate in both dry and wet cold conditions reduced the operational
effectiveness of all forces. Sun Dog One was a combined military
exercise of a tactical nature in Canada’s eastern Arctic. The exercise
served to test certain military assumptions about cold-weather
operations and demonstrated many operational difficulties peculiar
to Canada’s northern environment. For instance, troops found that
the same clothing that enabled them to conduct operations in the
Canadian Arctic also reduced their manoeuvrability and overall
effectiveness. Clothing restricted motor control, particularly during
periods of high wind chill when closed parka hoods reduced visibility
and hearing. Mitts restricted dexterity of the hands and the troops’
ability to handle weapons. Frequent and rapid weather changes also
significantly decreased the operational effectives of both men and
equipment during Sun Dog One. As noted in a diary of the exercise,
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the constant breakdown of snowmobiles was a dominating feature
of the troop experience.41 Such reoccurring failures of equipment
significantly reduced opportunity for tactical study and in turn
slightly obscured the value of recorded information. Yet the exercise
as a whole allowed observers to make many useful conclusions about
cold-weather military operations.

acclimatisation and indoctrination
Considering the vast range of the potential cold-weather battlefield,
acclimatisation of personnel to the Arctic environment was a chief
scientific concern of Canada’s defence establishment early in the
Cold War. While making his remarks about exercise Sweetbriar to
the House on 17 March 1950, Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton
stated: “Fighting in the north we know requires specially trained
personnel of high morale and top physical condition with first-class
equipment and air supremacy. These have been our targets and we
are making good progress.”42 At the time, the logistical difficulties of
cold-weather military preparedness of both men and equipment had
extended beyond the institutional capabilities of the army, or so was
the belief of Canada’s top military advisers.
By order of Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, Chief of the
General Staff, the Canadian army conducted exercise Sun Dog One
in part to assist the Defence Research Board (drb) in the execution
of its Acclimatization Research Programme.43 Established in 1947,
the drb was as an agency of the Department of National Defence.
As Canada’s first peacetime military science establishment, the drb’s
primary mandate was to provide scientific and technical assistance
to the Canadian armed forces as well as policy advice to the minister
of national defence.44 The board was civilian staffed and directed,
but a significant portion of its personnel had military experience

  Ibid.
  Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 2nd
Session: Vol. 1, 17 March 1950, 854.
43
   Army Headquarters, 3 January 1950, RG 24, Volume 2484, File HQS-726-40-397, LAC.
44
   For an institutional history covering the early formative years of the DRB, see
Captain D.J. Goodspeed, DRB: A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1958).
41
42
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from conducting operations research in the Second World War.45
Operational researchers and defence scientists helped the military better
understand the many characteristics of winter warfare by collecting raw
data for further analysis through study of army physical training exercises.46
Among the more active of drb’s research facilities in the early Cold War
period was its Defence Research Northern Laboratory at Fort Churchill, a
location that had an initial construction budget of one and a half million
dollars in 1948–1949.47
Although northern military exercises aimed to determine
the requirements and tactical techniques of supporting arms and
services operating in cold climate conditions, a select number also
supported Canada’s wider military and defence research that aimed
to understand the physical and psychological requirements of coldweather soldiery.48 The drb conducted its Acclimatization Research
Programme as part of this process at Fort Churchill during the
winter of 1949–1950. The research aimed to study the effect of
vitamin C on the physiological adaptation to cold of personnel while
in Canada’s Arctic environment. Scientists administered two sets of
pills to two groups of troops who conducted physically demanding
military operations under severe cold as part of exercise Sun Dog
One.49 The first group received placebo pills containing no vitamin
  Operational research (OR) involved scientific investigations carried out in the
field of operations and became widely recognised during the Second World War
when careful observations, analyses, and conclusions were first applied profitably to
wartime operations. For information on Canada’s wartime OR in the Second World
War, see Terry Copp, Montgomery’s Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest
Europe (Waterloo, Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies,
2000). Postwar OR concentrated primarily on combinations which involved weapons,
communications, transports and other systems that employed electronic and
mechanical components; see 44327—The Defence Research Board Canada, JGD/
MG01 (John G. Diefenbaker fonds), Volume 76, File VII/A/614, University Archives
and Special Collections, University of Saskatchewan. The Operational Research
Group of the DRB was specifically responsible for projects of joint-service or general
defence interest and for supply and coordination of civilian scientific personnel. See
Defence Research Board: Debate of the Annual Estimates in the House of Commons
1952, RG 24, Volume 4210, File 69-180-262, LAC.
46
  Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 85.
47
   Programme of Works for 1948–49 Joint Testing Station Fort Churchill, Manitoba,
RG 24, Volume 4150, File 52-751-268-1 vol. 2, LAC.
48
   Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 24, Volume 4206, File 270-0-89-6, LAC.
49
  The exact number of test participants remains unclear, but the DRB initially
requested the volunteer participation of thirty soldiers. See Defence Research
Northern Laboratory: Acclimatization Research Programme 194-50 Fort Churchill,
RG 24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-39-7, LAC.
45
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C while the second group received pills containing 500 mg per day. Each
test participant underwent a medical examination prior to and following
the experiment. Scientists also conducted urinalysis, blood pressure
measurements, and blood analysis twice weekly on troops throughout the
duration of the programme, which lasted from January to March 1950.
Each participant was administered pills prior to, during, and following
exposure to cold and was granted one week extra leave following the
completion of the test period. In their capacity as observers, drb scientists
received instructions to avoid doing anything that would interfere with
the conduct of exercise Sun Dog One. The evaluation of the capabilities
and limitations of all participating arms and services was important to
both the Canadian military and defence establishment in evolving tactical
doctrine for northern warfare.50
The drb’s acclimatisation research associated with Sun Dog
One was not the first attempt by scientists to deduce information
about cold-weather operations from participants. Scientists utilised
volunteers as test subjects in similar trials a year prior to Sun Dog
One in January and February 1949. Arrangements at the time were
in place to use volunteer troops stationed in the North, but before
tests commenced the army decided to pull its participation. In order
to meet the requirements of lead scientist Norman Mackworth, a
meeting was then held of administrative and service heads when,
“[a]fter much controversy over morale and other problems … it was
realised that the absolute limit had been reached on the provision
of test subjects.”51 Tests went ahead nonetheless and the scientists
utilised persons already employed at Defence Research Northern
Laboratory (dr nl) in Fort Churchill.
Funded jointly by Canada and the United Kingdom, the tests
conducted at dr nl were the first in a series of two.52 Fort Churchill
provided researchers the opportunity to conduct fieldwork in the
   General Instruction for Observers Participating in Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG
24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-39-7, LAC.
51
  Provision of Test Subjects for Defence Research Board, RG 24 vol. 2484, file
HQS-726-40-17-11, LAC.
52
  The acclimatisation research conducted by Norman Mackworth and his team
was jointly financed by the DRB of Canada, as well as the Medical Research Council
and the Medical Department of the Royal Navy. For a published account of the
experiments, see N.H. Mackworth, “Finger Numbness in Very Cold Winds,” Journal
of Applied Physiology 5, (1953), 533–543 and N.H. Mackworth, “Cold Acclimatization
and Finger Numbness,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B,
Biological Sciences 143, no. 912, (1955), 392–407.
50
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Canadian North under “natural conditions of cold” and compare
results to data recorded from physical observations of participants
who underwent similar examinations in a simulated cold-weather
experiment at Cambridge, England. Although the army was tentative
to cooperate, it seems troops already stationed at dr nl did eventually
participate as volunteers.53 Mackworth and his team conducted two
experiments to test the hypothesis that cold exposure may bring
about changes in skin texture that act as a “glove,” thereby improving
manual dexterity and performance in the cold by protecting the hands
against the transmission and loss of heat. In the first test, researchers
compared the sensitivity of a group of Aboriginal troops considered “well
acclimatised” to that of “unacclimatised” white troops. In the second,
researchers compared recorded skin sensitivity measurements taken
before and after exposure to severe cold while on exercise to results of
similar tests conducted in the Cambridge laboratory simulation. Results
from both cases reported no significant differences between those
considered already acclimatised and those not.54
Thirty-five volunteers comprised the first test group, of which
twenty were members of the Canadian army, nine were scientists, and
the other six were “labourers.” Mackworth and his team conducted
finger numbness tests on volunteer participants using an experimental
V-test apparatus. The V-test apparatus consisted of a flat wooden
ruler cut in half. The two halves of the ruler were bolted together at
one end, and at the other end were separated by half an inch. The gap
between the two inner edges of the device ranged between zero and
thirteen millimetres, according to the particular part that touched
the tip of the tested finger. Instructed to look away as researchers
administered the test, participants said whether they felt a gap when
  Available records are slightly ambiguous on this point. Military documents
suggest troops from exercise Prairie Tundra Two (1952) were utilised as test subjects,
whereas Mackworth’s published report in the Journal of Applied Physiology dates
the experiments to January and February 1949. The dates provided by Mackworth
coincide with the operational dates of Sigloo, seemingly making it the exercise during
which troops also volunteered to participate in acclimatisation research. It is also
plausible that troops volunteered to take part in DRNL research while not as part
of a formal military exercise.
54
  The “test subject” indicated when he first felt the two edges of the apparatus
as one; the width of the gap was the discrimination score charted on the “numbness
index.” For information on the administration of the V-test at Fort Churchill, see
M.F. Coffey, “Results of a Test for Changes in Skin Sensitive after a Period of
Acclimatization to the Cold,” DRNL Technical Paper No. 16, November 1953, RG
85, vol. 299, file 1009-2[5], LAC.
53
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the examiner firmly pressed the two edges against the tip of the left
forefinger. Researchers obtained ten such threshold readings from
each participant prior to cold exposure and averaged the readings to
establish an individual control.55
To test participants in the cold, researchers constructed a canvaslined tunnel equipped with a system of adjustable shutters designed
to channel prevailing winds. Researchers administered tests only on
“cold” or “very cold” days, when temperatures ranged from minus
twenty-five to minus thirty-five degrees Celsius and wind speeds
in the tunnel ranged from zero to ten miles per hour.56 Each test
participant entered the wind tunnel and stood at such a position
that their test hand was to the direction of the wind. A woolen glove
fully covered the test hand, except for one finger, left entirely bare
for an exposure time of three minutes. While exposed to the cold,
researchers obtained ten threshold readings from each participant.
The first reading was after one minute had passed and the others
roughly at twelve-second intervals thereafter. Administrators of the
test used these readings to devise a “numbness index,” and compared
the effect of cold and wind speed on manual dexterity.57
Mackworth calculated his data based on results obtained during
cold exposure at five to ten minute intervals. He used measurements
from the two-point tactile discrimination V-test to assess the finger
numbing effects of severe cold and wind chill conditions. Researchers
recorded 109 pairs in total, and Mackworth concluded that even
moderate winds lowered skin temperatures and increased the risk of
frostbite. He made this assessment partly in response to injuries that
occurred during the tests. On 9 February 1949, three “test subjects”
reported to the local station hospital complaining of pain in the left
index finger. The hospital report dated two days later stated that all
three men were “in a painful stage of defrosting” that “render[ed] their
fingers useless for an average of seven days.”58 Prevented from carrying
out their regular duties as a result of their physical injuries, these men
were also reported to have had suffered from a “morale problem.”59
55
   For a photograph of the V-test apparatus, see Mackworth, “Finger Numbness in
Very Cold Winds,” 533–543.
56
  Ibid.
57
  Ibid., 535.
58
  Provision of Test Subjects for Defence Research Board, RG 24 vol. 2484, file
HQS-726-40-17-11, LAC.
59
  Ibid.
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Mackworth told a slightly different version of the story. In a
published report of the experiments, he noted two rather than three
injuries: “Two of the subjects later developed a minor frostbite in the
finger that had been exposed and both were from the small group of
four persons who experienced the worst environment of all—the highest
wind speed of 8.1 to 10.0 mph and the very cold air temperature.”60
Under such extreme conditions, a change from normal sensitivity to
“total anesthesia,” or the complete loss of feeling in the finger, occurred
in under two and half minutes from the beginning of exposure. The
sudden onset of numbness resulted in a “[p]rolonged lowering of skin
temperature … especially in subject D, who later developed a rather
more severe lesion perhaps because of the nutritional impairment
[that] lasted longer [possibly as a result of reduced blood flow].”61 Both
frostbite “subjects developed definite surface reddening of the exposed
finger” in under three minutes of return to the warm room, at which
point “their fingers were still nearly freezing.”62
Mackworth further described both frostbite victims with specific
reference to each injury: “Subject C had a pale, white area about
two inches long and one-quarter of an inch broad on the index finger
on the side that had been nearest the wind source. This stretched
from the proximal inter-phalangeal joint to the tip of the index finger
where it broadened to about half-an-inch across.”63 The injury was
severe enough to restrict movement of the measured joint by fortyfive degrees and caused “some pain and tenderness but no detectable
swelling.” Yet by comparison, the other frostbite victim fared worse,
according to Mackworth: “Subject D was more severely affected and
had a definitely red and swollen forefinger … [that] was markedly
tender and painful, although it did not keep the subject awake at
night.”64 Fortunately, for both men, these injuries, what Mackworth
referred to as “accidental” and “temporary” effects of research, did
not prevent complete recovery. In both cases, the injured troops
returned to work after being off for four days.
Although Mackworth concluded that only two out of all tested
personnel succumbed to frostbite, another thirteen recorded single

   Mackworth, “Finger Numbness in Very Cold Winds,” 538.
  Ibid., 539.
62
  Ibid.
63
  Ibid.
64
  Ibid., 540.
60
61
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skin temperature readings lower than five degrees Celsius following
exposure to severe cold. Of the thirteen, seven had skin temperature
readings in the range between those recorded of “subjects C and
D,” or three point four degrees Celsius and minus two point three
degrees Celsius. At such low skin temperatures the onset of pain felt
by participants, especially those subjected to wind chill conditions,
resulted in reports of “definite discomfort.” The provision of “test
subjects” stopped immediately following the reported injuries, but on
24 February dr nl and Mackworth submitted a further request for
test subjects for use in “modified less-severe tests.”65 In response to
the request, the army agreed to provide volunteers for use in manual
dexterity tests where, according to military records, “no temporary
or permanent injury [would] result.”66 Moving forward, the army
agreed only to provide volunteers on the grounds that experimental
trials did not interrupt military training.
Sun Dog One offered an opportunity to extend acclimatisation
research conducted at dr nl . While scientific testing was limited to
a select number of volunteers, all participating troops underwent a
three week long indoctrination course prior to the exercise at either
Shilo, Manitoba or Petawawa, Ontario, followed by an additional
two weeks of Arctic acclimatisation training at Fort Churchill.67
Training involved manoeuvres in severe cold as well as the attempted
development of a specific mental acuity derived specifically from
the necessity to overcome the determinants of manual dexterity
in northern military operations. To meet this goal, indoctrination
training included lectures and exercises on snow craft, sea-ice, bush
living, and over snow vehicles.68 Troops learned how to erect tents,
use sleeping bags, give first aid, use a cooker, ski and snowshoe,
transport by sled and sleigh, navigate, and protect their hands in
order to properly and effectively handle metal weapons and supplies
in extreme cold.69 Indoctrination also adopted cold-weather living
  Provision of Test Subjects for Defence Research Board, RG 24 vol. 2484, file
HQS-726-40-17-11, LAC.
66
  Ibid.
67
   Wainwright, Alberta was also used as a location for indoctrination training but
not in preparation for Sun Dog One—the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
were indoctrinated there in training for Sweetbriar; see George Bain, “Canadians
Show Up Favorably,” The Globe and Mail, 6 March 1950, 17.
68
   “Arctic Training Cuts Casualties,” The Globe and Mail, 21 February 1948, 3.
69
   “Will Teach War This Winter At Four Canadian Schools,” The Globe and Mail,
29 November 1948, 17.
65
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and survival techniques known to Inuit. Troops learned to construct
“snowhouses” similar to the igloo, tested clothing and dress techniques
other than army standard, and practiced Arctic navigational methods
that utilised demarcation points in the natural environment around Fort
Churchill.70

cold-weather performance and military masculinity
Based on the collective experience of Arctic acclimatisation and
indoctrination, the final report of Sun Dog One declared that ten
weeks was the minimum period acceptable for northern cold-weather
training up to the battalion level. A proposed schedule of training
suggested three weeks indoctrination, two weeks trades training,
three weeks cold-weather familiarisation, and two weeks collective
training. In order to be of proper value, the report further suggested
that training only take place in conditions of climate and terrain
comparable to those of the projected theatre. Otherwise, the success
of the military operation “would be seriously prejudiced.”71 The
report concluded that properly trained and equipped troops could
operate successfully and with a degree of high morale in climates of
extreme cold for periods up to thirty days under active conditions.
The “ordinary” soldier conducting “normal” duties was comparable
in efficiency in the North to the solider operating in other, more
temperate theatres. Yet the efficiency of the tradesman in tasks
requiring manual dexterity was as little as 50 per cent of “normal”
under severe cold weather and high wind conditions.
Observers of Sun Dog One also noted that tactical mobility,
both dismounted and mechanised, was a primary deficiency of the
exercise. Three out of every five men were required to either haul
or carry the group living equipment, which left only a maximum of
40 per cent human strength to transport infantry support weapons,
additional ammunition, and fulfill other necessary operational duties.
Observers considered this unacceptable and recommended in the exercise

70
   The term igloo derives from the Inuit word iglu (plural igluit), which can refer to a
structure built of any material and is not restricted exclusively to snowhouses. For details
on “snowhouse” construction at Fort Churchill as part of indoctrination training, see
Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 24, Volume 4206, File 270-0-89-6, LAC.
71
  Ibid.
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final report that weight reductions in rations, fuel, tentage, and other
operational equipment be implemented to produce the “lower standard of
comfort” necessary to overcome the “dangers and hardships of the cold
[that] have been brought into reasonable perspective” by Sun Dog One.72
Manliness was a purview of the successful troop on Sun Dog
One. Although the conclusions of the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps
conceded, “there is no requirement for special troops” to conduct coldweather military operations, “special Arctic training” was determined
necessary to acclimatise and indoctrinate “ordinary” soldiers. Under
conclusions and recommendations of personnel, the final report of
Sun Dog One noted the necessity of indoctrination to “weed out any
soldiers who are weak physically or who are NOT temperamentally
suited to be part of a small group for a long period.”73 Indoctrination
aimed specifically to remove the “undesirables” who “only cause a
lowering of morale and do not pull their share of the weight.”74 This
extended to persons with glasses or persons who had undergone
skin grafting on the face, as both might be unable to operate to the
required level of efficiency in certain cold-weather capacities.
Military discourse also equated performance in the cold to
attitudes about virile masculinity. In exceptional circumstances,
frostbite necessitating medical attention was a matter of disciplinary
action. In other words, planners of Sun Dog One recommended
that troops receive penalty for personal injury that resulted from
“negligible” exposure to severe cold.75 If frostbite were to occur,
troops were to assume personal responsibility for their injuries and
report for subsequent punishment. Despite this recommendation,
there seems to be no record of disciplinary action ever having resulted
from a frostbite injury. Nevertheless, the forethought does highlight
the gauche understanding of virile notions toward the development of
cold-weather soldiery. The military ultimately concluded, “troops need
not be hand-picked” for Arctic service but “some weeding out during
the training period must be permitted to eliminate temperamentally
or physically unsuitable men who would otherwise become liabilities

  Ibid.
  Ibid.
74
  Ibid.
75
   Disciplinary action was “taken against personnel in camp suffering from frostbite
when there [was] evidence of negligence,” see Provision of Test Subjects for Defence
Research Board, RG 24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-17-11, LAC.
72
73
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during operation.”76 Evocative of this very process, acclimatisation
and indoctrination was symptomatic of broader Cold War desires to
understand and overcome physical and climatic constraints, where
science, as Matthew Farish points out, was used in an attempt to
create the “masculine Cold Warrior” capable of recognising and
regulating as far as possible “a set of hostile natural environments.”77
In creating space for Canada’s cold-weather soldier to assume the
conceptualised role of the Cold War national protector, acclimatisation
research and indoctrination training perpetuated and legitimised
postwar modernist ideals of masculinity. Research and training
aimed to equip troops with the proper levels of pugnacity, truculence,
and testosterone required to remain effectively “aggressive” under
conditions of extreme cold. Contemporary attitudes suggested great
physical and mental strength derived from such qualities, and so the
maintenance of a high level of morale depended on virile notions
of soldiery. According to drb scientist and Arctic military exercise
observer Cecil Law, well trained and indoctrinated troops “could run
circles around the mobile strike force” and were essentially no match
in the cold against untrained and unacclimatised units.78 Military and
defence records pertaining to Sun Dog One paint a similar picture.
Reports suggest that Arctic acclimatisation and indoctrination was
effective training for cold-weather military operations. Canadian troops
never fought in an operation that would test their abilities in the cold,
so the effectiveness of northern training remains questionable. What
is clear is that there is no evidence to suggest that training instilled in
troops certain innate qualities required of northern military defence.
The development of cold-weather military masculinity was superficial.

conclusion
This article means not to suggest that Sun Dog One is fully
representative of Canada’s early postwar Arctic military training.
Nor does it suggest that Sun Dog One represents the full extent of
   Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” RG 24, Volume 4206, File 270-0-89-6, LAC.
  Matthew Farish, “Creating Cold War Climates: The Laboratories of American
Globalism,” in J.R. McNeil and Corinna R. Unger, eds. Environmental Histories of
the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 51–83.
78
   Interview with Cecil Ernest Law [sound recordings]: CWM Oral History Project, 6
August 2008, Interview Control Number 31D 9 LAW, Canadian War Museum Archives.
76
77
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scientific collaboration between the drb and the military. Indeed, the
Canadian military participated in no fewer than twenty-two northern
exercises in the first decade of the Cold War.79 Scientists featured
regularly as observes, referees and participants. Nevertheless, Sun
Dog One was unique. When Omond Solandt made his address to the
Empire Club of Toronto on 30 March 1950, he spoke briefly about Sun
Dog One and of the importance of collaboration between Canada,
the United States, and Britain in defence of the Arctic. In his mind,
exercises Sweetbriar and Sun Dog One had collectively demonstrated
that two or more sovereign nations could effectively carry out joint
military exercises in severe cold conditions. Solandt’s speech was a
clear and public Cold War message that the Canadian military and
defence establishment was fully committed to Arctic defence, and
was not alone in its stand. Yet when discussing the importance of
northern military operations to the Canadian public, Solandt and
other military and defence representatives chose to highlight only the
benefits of indoctrination training and joint operational execution. It
seems the specifics of vitamin C research and acclimatisation testing
went unknown to the public, but evidence has survived though
military and defence records as well as published medical reports.
Available evidence makes clear that in the immediate postwar
period the Canadian army sought a deeper understanding of the
many characteristics of winter warfare and in its search embraced
experimental scientific study in an attempt to deduce information
unique to the development of cold-weather soldiery. Northern
environmental conditions required special investigation because the
Canadian Arctic and sub-Arctic climate deviated significantly from
the conditions under which most of the army’s concepts, doctrine,
and tactics were developed.80 Operational researchers and defence
scientists contributed at the time by collecting raw data for further
analysis through participatory study of the army’s physical training
exercises. Men were the chosen test subjects.
Although not surprising considering what little reference they
receive in the lexicon of Canada’s military history, terms such as
acclimatisation and indoctrination find little reference with the
Canadian military establishment. This should be of particular
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concern to scholars of Canada’s military in the Cold War, because
together acclimatisation and indoctrination comprised the base
upon which a unique form of military preparedness developed in
northern Canada in the early postwar years. Canada’s postwar
military doctrine derived from societal factors and the nature of the
Cold War within which science, defence, and diplomacy occurred.
As evident by cold-weather research and training conducted at Fort
Churchill and as part of Sun Dog One, defence science, in addition to
geopolitics, shaped Canada’s Cold War national security apparatus.
Cold-weather testing on male troops supported and perpetuated
idealised notions of virile soldiery. Involving researchers and scientists
in important military investigations on northern warfare developed,
in theory, a model for future combat development work. From proper
scientific analyses in climatic conditions, the Canadian military
and defence establishment hoped to derive information to improve
operational concepts, doctrine, and tactical principles pertinent to coldweather warfare.81 Sufficient knowledge and adequately satisfactory
research material was deemed to have been obtained because of Sun
Dog One and other comparable cold-weather exercises. The negative
consequences that resulted from acclimatisation research appear
only briefly in available records. Researchers desired the potential
benefits of cold-weather scientific discovery in spite of any moral or
ethical issues that stemmed from human testing. While additional
research is required to elucidate the deep implications of postwar
defence science in Canada, it seems safe to suggest that the human
and environmental legacy of Cold War militarism deserves attention.
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